a “it is difficult to Predict, especially about the future”
a Yogi Berra (American baseball player, famous for his comments and jokes (they are called “LoginName”), which are often obvious tautology or contradictory meaning. — approx. lane).
the Summary
Russian-American relations not seen since the cold war decline. A serious dialogue at the highest level between the two countries practically stopped. There is no reason to believe that in the near future, relations will improve.
However, it is unlikely that this is forever: even during the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union supported albeit limited, but serious dialogue. Despite the many differences, the contact between the two countries sooner or later will resume and, possibly, the new Russian and American leaders will adhere to courses, not so focused on confrontation. What will be the agenda, for example, in the not too distant 2030?
of the Changing environment in the international arena:
- Geopolitical conditions, which will be the leaders of Russia and the USA in 2030.
- Conditionally bipolar world. The US and China will remain major players on the world stage, even if in the next few years their ability and desire to act on a global scale will be significantly limited by the pandemic coronavirus. At the same time, a number of important state and non-state actors will continue to have a significant impact on regional and global processes. Eurasia will remain a strategic centre of gravity of the world.
- the World is armed. New deadly and potentially destabilizing military technology will become an additional threat to the nonproliferation regime.
- a World where more conflicts. Conflicts on the Eurasian continent and its borders are likely to become more, and they will be more intense. Many of them may be risk factors for both Moscow and Washington.
- the World of strategic instability. The United States and Russia develop military technology not covered by existing agreements on arms control, and in General under any rules or limitations. In the absence of regulation, the risk of error or miscalculation will increase.
- a World transformed by technology. Technological breakthroughs in various areas (related to artificial intelligence, 5G networks and renewable sources of energy) will inevitably increase the competitive advantage of the United States to Russia.
the Consent unlikely
Accumulated by both parties claim the profound differences in interests, values and concepts of order almost completely eliminate any possibility of sustainable partnerships, a reboot or at least a significant strengthening of ties in the near future dsatilite. His role in this play and the internal policy of the two powers. So to reach a mutually beneficial settlement will not be easy. American foreign policy community believes that Russia is hostile, and in the foreseeable future his view, most likely, will not change. Those who are responsible for policy of the United States, concerned about active actions of Russia on the world stage, and its partnership with China they inspire more fear. Similarly, the foreign policy community in Russia sees the US aggressive and hostile power, which tend to act without regard to other countries, threatens the internal stability of Russia and seeks to dominate in the international community.
the Solution: focus on the relationship itself
Because Russian-American relations, most likely, will remain tense, Moscow and Washington must work with those of their aspects that cause the differences. To level the relationship, the countries need to resume dialogue at the highest level, at least on these issues. This will not be a panacea for existing problems, but may create at least the limited channels of cooperation. In such dialogue for the United States will be the priority the following objectives:
- to avoid the conflict between Russia and the USA in the Euro-Atlantic region and reduce the risk of uncontrolled escalation;
- to upgrade the system of strategic stability that is eroded by the erosion of arms control and the development of new military technologies;
- to work together to prevent the emergence of nuclear weapons in other countries;
- to preserve peace and stability in the middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf;
- to prevent the hegemony of China in the Asia-Pacific region;
- to regulate the competition between Russia and the United States in cyberspace and space.
To begin the long process of restoring partial trust, the two countries need to develop a scheme for cooperation in areas of common interest and ways of resolving differences before they escalate. It would be better if on this path the US will focus on small and pragmatic steps, not global goals. How will be able to realize the opportunities that will appear along with the scheme of cooperation will depend on the heads of their leadership, will, plans, and will they be able to overcome the wall of mistrust and resistance of its citizens, politicians and lawmakers.
of Introduction
This article attempts to go beyond today’s extremely antagonistic Russian-American relations and to imagine how these relations would look like in 2030. The most predictable scenario described Dmitry Trenin (Dmitri Trenin. The Relationship Between the USA and Russia in the Trump Era. — Carnegie Moscow Center. — May 14, 2019) — everything will get worse and then get worse. But you can imagine a situation when bilateral relations will be new dynamics that will make possible continuous strategic dialogue on a wide range of issues? If such a dialogue will start, will the leadership of both countries are ready to solve problems or work on them in the case of coincidence of interests, and in their mismatch — skilfully to build relationships competition? If Yes — what will it take for the two countries to reach that stage?
In the first part of the paper describes global trends of the next decade, which may affect Russian-American relations and American interests in Russia. In the second part of the assumptions about how these terms, together with domestic political factors may impact the strategic directions of the American and Russian foreign policy. Finally, the concluding section presents a review of the objectives and priorities of the United States in the framework of these relations in a comprehensive, though not exhaustive set of questions.
the Grand strategy of the United States and changes in the global arena
In the next decade, the traditional geopolitical components of Grand strategy the United States will not change: the primacy in the Western hemisphere, preventing the hegemony of a hostile power in critical areas of the Eurasian territory, as well as maintaining freedom of navigation. Russia could hamper the implementation of the us plans, although there were cases of positive intervention — for example, the nuclear threat from Iran and North Korea.
However, despite the problems that Russia poses to the United States, it is not the global threat to American influence in the Western hemisphere, the Asia-Pacific region, Eurasia and the Persian Gulf. Weakening transatlantic relations and American influence in Europe was caused mainly by the change of priorities USA, the hostility of President Donald trump to Europe, as well as changes in the European political dynamic, which Russia used to enhance the disorder — and to a lesser extent Russia’s desire for hegemony in Europe. Major U.S. interests will remain the same, but to pursue their future administrations will have to take account of changing international realities. And the relationship with Russia, which will suit US and how to establish them, also will largely depend on the situation on the world stage.
It is impossible to predict how the world will be in 2030, especially in light of a possible global crises in health, environment, and economy — which, as demonstrated by the pandemic coronavirus, quite real. However, it is possible to identify a number ��major trends — economic, political, military and social — that will affect what will happen in the world by 2030. As a starting point, the authors of this article took the report of the National intelligence Council of the US “Global Trends 2030” (“Global trends 2030”). It describes a number of “Megatrends” that will affect Russian-American relations in the coming decade (National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds. — December, 2012). The following are the most significant of these trends and their implications.
the Conditionally bipolar world
The balance of military and economic power will continue to shift East and South. The US and China will maintain the status of superpowers in key areas (namely military, economic, technological and diplomatic), but there will be many centers of concentration of power at the international (UN) and regional levels — EU, India, Japan and Russia (in the sphere of its privileged interests, which Russia itself declared its supremacy) — that can have an impact in specific areas. To global security and prosperity will also be affected by non-state actors, such as Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple, and transnational forces such as pandemic infectious diseases, jihadist terrorism, and the movement of populists, nationalists and nativists. Existing world order is most properly called conditionally bipolar. But whatever label on it or glued it, America should consider in its foreign policy one essential point: even if China more other countries will benefit from global distribution of forces, the other (albeit smaller) centres of influence will have a serious resistance to attempts to take control of critically important geopolitical regions of Eurasia.
It is unclear how such a shift may affect Russian foreign policy. The Kremlin is in favour of a multipolar balance of power in the world since the proclamation of the Primakov doctrine in the mid 1990-ies. It is logical to assume that under the influence of such changes in Moscow may begin to behave in a more restrained, as it will cease to see in the US the main obstacle to the world order that suits her and the recognition of Russia as an influential power. However, at the same time, Moscow may regard the movement toward a multipolar world as a blow to the Russian positions, because it would have to be considered with other major players, and her own weight in relative terms will decrease. Such a psychological blow to the Russian ego can give the Kremlin courage, and he starts to act more decisively to assert themselves.
the World armed
The spread of new deadly nuclear and non-nuclear military technologies with destabilising potenzialem, as well as their availability to a greater number of state and non-state actors can significantly undermine the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Although the US and Russia have not always been able to agree on approaches and priorities, both countries are interested in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and against the nuclear threat of Iran and North Korea they presented a United front. In the next decade, it is possible, although unlikely, a nuclear weapon will attempt to acquire a number of countries — Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and maybe South Korea and Japan. Meanwhile, North Korea will continue to increase its nuclear Arsenal, and Iran could resume efforts to implement the nuclear weapons program that it is not possible to return to any form of nuclear deal (AGREEMENT, a Joint comprehensive plan of action).
The latest technologies such as synthetic biology, could pave the way to a completely new type of threat: the creation of dangerous pathogens, including non-state actors. In this case, there may be additional conditions and possibilities for Russian-American cooperation in the sphere of control over the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other dangerous technologies.
of a World where more conflicts
It is expected that inter-state and intra-state conflicts in Eurasia and around it, including in adjacent or neighboring regions of Russia will occur more frequently and become more intense. It is important for Moscow to maintain its influence and stability (that is, in her understanding, to eliminate Western influence) in the border areas, which it considers as its sphere of privileged interests. The war with Georgia and Ukraine, and intervention in a number of regional conflicts in the former Soviet Union was caused by the Kremlin’s desire to assert its influence in these territories. But in most of the conflicts in the neighboring Russian States, if not all, major US interests are not affected, and open military confrontation between Russia and the United States as a result of such conflicts is unlikely. Moreover, the experiences in close airspace over Syria, when two armies act in parallel and successfully avoided major conflicts, suggests that Washington and Moscow have both the desire and means to resolve even the most complex situations.
the World of strategic instability
USA and Russia are developing new, more sophisticated and deadly weapons, many of which do not fall under existing agreements, arms control, and in General under any rules or limitations. Among such systems — hypersonic missiles with guided warheads and cruise missiles (as I��Ernie and with non-nuclear warheads), cyber weapons, weapons to non-nuclear rapid strike, anti-satellite weapons, anti-missile systems space-based and stand-alone systems.
The integration of these capacities in the American and Russian arsenals and the strategic plans put into question the relevance of the Russian-American regime of arms control, which still remains in force, and increase the likelihood of both crisis instability and arms race. Also increase the risk of the outbreak of war due to accident or miscalculation and the threat of retaliation will be less secure. In particular, it is highly likely that advanced missile system and hypersonic weapons with non-nuclear warheads will significantly affect the strategic stability system. And the United States and Russia are interested in the control of dynamics of development of these areas, and this common interest can become the basis for cooperation on the development of new rules and restrictions for the maintenance of strategic stability.
of a World transformed by technology
By 2030, the world will take a step forward in technology. Most likely, technological innovation, especially related to artificial intelligence (AI), 5G networks and renewable energy will have a significant impact not only on the economy of Russia and the United States and the strategic balance between them, but on the global economy and the nature of the international system. Such technologies — and, equally important, the ability to set the standards by which they are developed and monetized — is to determine the weight of the state and non-state actors, and new winners and losers.
Note that the prediction of scale and scope technological progress — including the development of medical equipment, treatments, medicines, and devices for surveillance and monitoring, aimed at containment and suppression of pandemic, — goes far beyond the content of the article. But it is obvious that technological progress can change a lot for Russia and for the United States, and questions of its possible impact on the balance of power in the world economy and individual countries should be included in the agenda of the bilateral discussions.
of the Trajectory of Russia’s foreign policy and the U.S.
In the next decade accumulated by both parties claim the profound differences at the level of interests, values, and concepts of world order and domestic political conditions almost completely eliminate any possibility of sustainable partnerships, a reboot or at least a significant strengthening of ties. In other words, between the two countries will remain strategic competition. How long the country will remain more opponents and as Russian-American relations ��Udut to develop in the next ten years will depend largely on geopolitical trends and political factors that affect the foreign policy priorities of both countries.
the United States
Whatever the outcome of the presidential election of 2020, Russia will remain a controversial subject for American domestic policy at least for another few years — and even longer if Moscow will continue to meddle in U.S. elections. If in 2020, the trump will be re-elected and decides to unilaterally embark on the path of improvement of Russian-American relations, he will certainly face intense opposition from the Congress at the time, when you try to normalize ties with Russia, and even more to cancel even part of the sanctions imposed after 2014 — especially in the lack of progress in resolving the conflict in Eastern Ukraine.
The US leadership will continue the debate about what should be the policy of the country against Russia, so the President will have little chance to take a conciliatory stance, although the possibility of shallow, largely symbolic change in the relationship remain. Washington will remain concerned with the mitigation of internal political contradictions, economic recovery after the pandemic coronavirus, containment of China and reduce its disproportionately large-scale military intervention in the middle East and southwest Asia in recent decades.
If trump re-elected, he will continue to ignore the multilateral approach to relations with allies and to give preference to bilateral situational diplomacy in the spirit of one-sided and nationalistic agenda “America above all”. If elected the former Vice-President Joe Biden, likely that, despite the declared desire to restore the liberal global order, US ambitions and their proposals for solution of pressing international problems will be limited to internal and external circumstances.
In addition, the administration Biden will take time to neutralize the damage done to the credibility and reputation of the United States by his predecessor. Washington will continue to try to negotiate at national level on major investments in large-scale events foreign policy. As shown by opinion polls, most Americans are tired of foreign commitments and want their leaders focused more on internal problems, which greatly reduced the quality of life of many citizens (John Halpin, Brian Katulis, Peter Juul, Karl Agne, and Jim Gerstein, and Nisha Jain. America Adrift: How the U.S. Foreign Policy Debate Misses What Voters Really Want. — Center for American Progress. — May 5, 2019). It is obvious that when at any time can be a threat of a new pandemic and the need to resolve the attendant eco��ohmic, political and social problems, it is a requirement of the Americans seems fair.
Thus, in the coming years, the US may play a less active and meaningful role in global Affairs and how they will be involved in them, will partly depend on the personality of the President. The unipolar period is over. The Association of American allies has weakened, and the system of international relations transformirovalsya in a much more complex, uncertain and chaotic world order, which involves a change in the balance of forces on a global and regional players.
Established in the years of the cold war and after its end, the concept of leadership, exceptional situation and the indispensability of the United States has not fully adapted to the new realities. The controversy surrounding the Russian-American relations, apparently, does not subside: Washington will continue to see Moscow’s behavior, protecting what she considers a sphere of its legitimate interests, the evidence of the hostility of Russia — first of all, to the world order based on rules and protected by the United States; second, to the solutions of global problems offered by Washington; and third — to the American commitment to state sovereignty, independence and adherence to democracy.
of Russia
With a fair degree of certainty we can assume that in the next decade, and possibly longer, Russia will retain the current rate — both domestic and foreign — regardless of whether there will be Vladimir Putin President. This forecast is based on the stability of some of the foundations of Russian domestic and foreign policy. They will survive Putin and his successor, whoever he was. Such bases include the tendency to authoritarian measures and centralization, the desire to maintain great power status, to expand its presence and influence in the world, to weaken the transatlantic link and Europe dominate the post-Soviet space, to question Western standards of democracy and the rule of law, to increase the polarity of the world to support the partnership with China and refuse to integrate with security systems and of the economy in which the leading role played by Western countries.
the Washington should take this into account and focus on:
- the settlement of specific issues concerning the strategic competition between Russia and the United States in General, instead of striving for a complete reboot of the relations, large-scale agreements or other breakouts;
- reducing the risk of open military conflict through the coordination of acute competition, the desire to cooperate in the fight against common regional and transnational threats and convergence in the case that the world situation will change.
the FactorsOsmonova deflect
Most likely, the Russian-American relations will remain at the current level for many more years, but there are other options. The trajectory of Russian foreign policy can significantly change the four events.
There is a small chance that a sharp economic downturn or a large-scale wave of public protests will weaken the domestic and foreign policy course of Russia, as happened in 1990-ies. In this case, the main problem for the US and the West will be Russia’s weakness: its ability to maintain internal order in the face of political, social and economic difficulties and the realization of the ambitions of great powers will be severely limited. Russia in such circumstances, you may go for reconciliation with the West to create a more favorable external environment, as well as to strengthen trade, technological and investment ties.
Another trigger could be an attempt next Russian leader to carry out major reforms similar to Gorbachev’s perestroika and Yeltsin’s economic and political reforms. This turn will push the global ambitions of the Kremlin in the background, and possibly weaken its political grip that will plunge Russia into a series of upheavals. As a result, Russia will not necessarily imbued with the location to USA, but certainly will pay more attention to domestic issues than foreign policy achievements. However, one should not forget that the internal instability of Russia 1990-ies has hit US interests in the area of security. So the future of the Russian reforms can have the same effect.
The third trigger could be the arrival to replace Putin more impulsive or less-experienced leader — it will make Russian-American relations are less stable and explosive. It is unlikely that the departure of Putin from the political scene will lead to the strengthening of pluralism in Russia and a more peaceful foreign policy towards the West. Despite the fact that in the West consider Putin’s authoritarian and assertive leader with twenty years of leadership and participation in the global agenda showed that in General, he is shrewd and experienced politician. This is evidenced, for example, his decision not to use Russian troops to help Syria, to be protected from Turkish attacks. Whoever his successor may well inherit the negative traits of Putin, but they will not be balanced with his experience. The internal economic difficulties, even heightened pandemic coronavirus and low oil prices may not impact on the foreign policy ambitions of Russia. This is what happened after a sharp fall in oil prices in 2014: the Russian economy has suffered a great loss, but the global ambitions of the Kremlin was not injured.
And finally, last��m trigger may be a confrontation with Russia, the growing power of China, especially its encroachment on the territory that Russia considers its sphere of privileged interests. If China maintains the current trajectory of foreign policy, Moscow will eventually be faced with a choice: to try to curb China’s ambition or hope for his goodwill. And even though it seems unlikely, but the relationship of China and Russia may deteriorate, when Moscow will start to be treated with great suspicion by the geopolitical intentions of Beijing. Such a development would be for the United States and Russia, perhaps the best reason to reject hostility and to unite efforts in the interests of containment of Chinese expansion.
It is important to understand that Russian foreign policy is subject to both internal and external factors. An important role in its formation played by US actions — both real and perceived. So, a lot can depend on how you will represent yourself in future administrations of the President of the United States global role and responsibilities of America in the next ten years and how you plan to use its power. Therefore, one of the key issues — will Washington cope with his desire to intervene in situations that affect important Russian interests (and whether or not he is willing to recognize them as such), but it does not matter much for the United States. For example, the US political leadership could not hold back and speak in support of the popular movements or “color revolutions” in Russia or its neighbors. Washington will probably make the interests of Russia in these States for illegal manifestations of its neo-imperialist ambitions, but in fact its ability to influence policy is extremely limited.
If Washington will be a more sober look at things and recognize the concern of the Russian leadership, which fears for the stability of their political positions, will see the actions and reactions of Moscow to protect its interests, will begin to use less ambitious rhetoric and is ready for a more open dialogue with Russia — and none of this was observed during the Ukrainian crisis of 2013-2014, the observance of these conditions can improve the situation for all concerned. Last but not least — to encourage Russia to soften its position against the US and their main interests.
You can try to cut and the other acute angle: it is obvious that, despite the official rate, the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the East has reached its limit in the foreseeable future for Ukraine and Georgia door to the Alliance is in fact closed. The actual recognition of this situation — without a formal review of the open door policy proposed in 2008 but with the decline of its significance in statements of Alliance could be the key to a more stable from the point of view of European security.
This does not preclude assistance to Ukraine and Georgia in the security sphere, neither from the US nor the Alliance. As one expert noted, “mitigating America’s claims about its exceptionalism and reducing the role of rules in the regulation of international conduct [this course] would facilitate the emergence of agreement among the great powers and the coexistence of different value systems as ways to create order and peace” (Thomas Graham. U. S.-Russian Relations in a New Era. — National Interest. — January 6, 2019). If Washington will go in this direction, believes the Russian side, and Russia could take a more peaceful stance.
The appearance of a great share of skepticism in the evaluation of such a development is inevitable, but it is still worth to follow closely the positions of the future leaders. Although the resumption of meaningful dialogue between Russia and the USA is not a panacea, and there were cases, when he really was none of the participants benefit, stable strategic dialogue at the highest level at least would show Moscow that Washington is serious about its interests, and began to melt the ice of mutual mistrust. True reconciliation would require both countries greater respect for the interests and feelings of each other. Anyway — most likely scenarios of the near future the US and Russia, most likely, will remain enemies even if they have less resources or resolve for large-scale foreign policy initiatives. And still — favorable the result will be the circumstances or not — what goals will haunt US in relations with Russia in 2030?
the Aims and priorities USA
To resume a productive strategic dialogue between Russia and the United States will not be easy. The negotiations became productive and began the slow process of restoring mutual confidence, the two countries will need to develop a scheme for cooperation in areas of common or compatible interests and common threats, as well as a scheme for the settlement of disputes. This ambitious and multi-task, which is complicated on both sides by the past, so its solution is more appropriate specific pragmatic actions, not some big ambitious projects. If you allow the relationship and circumstances, the priority for US should be the following objectives: to avoid conflict with Russia in the Euro-Atlantic region and reduce the risk of spontaneous conflict and its escalation; to modernize the system of strategic stability that is eroded by the erosion of arms control and the development of new military technologies; to work together to prevent the emergence of nuclear weapons in other Stwounds; to maintain peace and stability in the middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf; to prevent the hegemony of China in the Asia-Pacific region; to regulate the competition between Russia and America in cyberspace.
to prevent conflict between Russia and the U.S.
To avoid conflict, especially nuclear is an absolute priority in U.S. bilateral relations with Russia. It is possible that the risk of spontaneous outbreak of war between the countries because of accident or miscalculation and misunderstanding — for example, a military response to a false warning of attack — much higher than the probability of a planned attack (Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn. The Return of Doomsday: The New Nuclear Arms Race-and How Washington and Moscow Can Stop It. — Foreign Affairs. September/October, 2019). The most dangerous areas — the Baltic and the Black sea, where the Alliance members are most vulnerable for a surprise attack, and the forces of NATO and Russia are in close proximity to each other. By the end of the next decade, if not sooner, and the Alliance, and Russia should mutually agree to take the deterrent and defensive positions in both regions, to eliminate the possibility of a collision or greatly reduce it.
To improve bilateral relations is necessary to restore a certain degree of trust, matter how utopian it may sound. One way is to resume at the highest level of serious strategic dialogue, which primarily should be focused on the creation of a system of mutual security in the Euro-Atlantic region (Des Browne, Wolfgang Ischinger, Igor Ivanov, and Sam Nunn. Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region, Co-Chairs Summary. — Nuclear Threat Initiative. — 2013). Parties should discuss the following questions.
As far as Russia is concerned by the risk of escalation and spontaneous conflict in the European theater of war? If Moscow fears the consequences of the emergence of new weapons and technologies, what actions from her point of view, can be taken to solve the problem of short warning time available, the chain of command to de-escalate the crisis before it escalates into armed conflict? As, according to Moscow, the crisis can begin between NATO and Russia and what are the scenarios of its possible escalation? Military intelligence and other innovations affect the performance of Russia about crisis situations?
Should the US and Russia, in addition to strict compliance with their obligations under the agreements of the Organization for security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to consider more proactive measures to ensure transparency in the movement of troops and notifications about exercises, limitations of scale, nature and location of military exercises, as well as the installation of border deployment of armed forces and weapons that can strike deep into NATO territory and Russia? Should countries to consider the idea of talks on new measures of control n��d arms in Europe that would restrict the deployment of destabilizing systems of non-nuclear weapons?
How to improve existing communication channels to resolve the crisis, to reduce the risk of collision? For example, should parties create a new civil-military channels for communication with each other and maybe start to use them in online mode to develop and test procedures for the resolution of the crisis?
the Support system of strategic stability
Strategic stability, which in this case is defined as the condition when neither the United States nor Russia has no reason to launch a nuclear first strike, is an integral part of the nuclear relations of Russia and the USA for more than sixty years. Because of the potentially powerful retaliatory strike each of the countries feels vulnerable in front of another, and this circumstance does not change, despite changes in the location of the strategic forces and innovations of military technology. And the United States and Russia are interested to support the system of strategic stability and eliminate any reasons to use nuclear weapons, but to do so will be harder because there are such weapons systems and technologies that have the potential to destabilize the nuclear relations between the two countries.
In the short and medium term, the risk of planned large-scale nuclear attack is extremely small. However, in the more distant future, the absence of a bilateral strategic arms control, the lack of an extended Treaty between Russia and the USA on measures for the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (start-III) and funding of conventional and nuclear arsenals in both countries new and potentially destabilizing technologies can have long-term negative consequences for strategic stability. Worse, may increase the risk of non-nuclear conflict between the two countries due to chance or error, but such conflict, in turn, could escalate into a nuclear.
Apparently, by 2030, if not earlier, the US and Russia will be ready to develop a new regime for the restructuring and adaptation of the architecture of the Russian-American arms control. Such a structure would help maintain strategic stability as both countries strive to include in their military strategy and doctrine for cyber-warfare, strategic non-nuclear weapons, hypersonic missiles, interceptors, space-based BMD, ASAT weapons and AI systems. The development of such a framework should be the main objective of the resumed Russian-American dialogue at the highest level on issues of strategic stability and reduce the risk of a nuclear conflict. Dialogue to be meaningfullyth, need to include discussion of the following questions.
As Russia and the U.S. to determine short-term and long-term risks and requirements of strategic stability? What are the potential threats to strategic stability, Moscow and Washington consider the most serious and how they suggest to deal with them? For example, if fear is still Moscow that the deployment of us strategic missile defense system will deprive it of the ability to retaliate in the event of a first strike the US? As far as both sides are concerned about the risks of a nuclear escalation triggered by accident or mistake of the military? Do they believe that it is possible to maintain strategic stability without taking into account non-nuclear forces and missile defense?
What will turn the absence of a Treaty on the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty) for the system of strategic stability? Instead of throwing unlimited race nuclear missiles of intermediate and short range, it might be better for reasons of mutually guaranteed security on a bilateral basis to prohibit the deployment of the INF Treaty banned missiles in Europe and to agree on clear measures of control over the implementation of these obligations? Shouldn’t at least restrict, if not ban this type of weapon in the future agreement?
Regardless of the outcome of the negotiations on the extension of the start-III whether the US and Russia to try to make the next similar contract, or rather to take a number of the agreements of confidence-building measures and launch mechanisms to regulate the strategic nuclear forces and other systems, both nuclear and non-nuclear? Among the latter — strategic nuclear weapons, nonstrategic nuclear warheads, nuclear weapons, medium-range, hypersonic rocketplane and cruise missiles, missile defense systems, cyber-warfare and space-based weapons.
When and how Washington and Moscow should consider the involvement of other nuclear powers to the process of arms control? How large, from the point of view of the USA and Russia, should be phased concrete practical steps to strengthen strategic stability and deterrence, which will be outside the framework of formal agreements on arms control and will be developed through, for example, single or mutual changes in nuclear strategy, increasing transparency (for example, by increasing the exchange of information), discussion of the rules and regulations of collision avoidance and related measures to improve confidence?
You will support the United States and Russia changes in nuclear policy and strategy, which will be focused more on the principle enunciated by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985: “a Nuclear war neopostima, it can’t be winners”?
Should Washington and Moscow to abandon such strategies, as the launch on warning and launch under attack, due to their unreliability and potential danger — because strategic stability is based on the principle of mutually assured destruction and the potential retaliation?
How and by what standards the United States and Russia would regulate the use of cyber weapons, AI and other new technologies to impact on the strategic early warning systems and operational management. Is it possible to monitor the implementation of these norms and agreements, but if it is not possible to implement fully — whether these standards at least to increase the confidence of countries to each other?
Should Russia and the United States to consider a ban on the deployment of space-based interceptors or laser weapons for missile defense and anti-satellite weapons? Should there be traffic rules for satellites and other space objects? If such a weapon system cannot prohibit or restrict any agreement for defence programmes should be adopted to regulate military activities in space?
to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
Before the collapse of relations in 2014 and the U.S. withdrawal from AGREEMENT the US and Russia had a common agenda in the field of non-proliferation. Both countries are interested in the number of nuclear powers in the world has increased, and weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists. Moreover, there is virtually no such problems of non-proliferation that can be solved without Russian-American cooperation or tacit consent of Russia (Robert Einhorn. Prospects for U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation Cooperation. — Brookings Institution. — February 25, 2016).
Regional challenges. In the coming ten years, North Korea will become more serious nuclear threat to the region and possibly the United States. Iran can return to the implementation of the program of nuclear weapons, if he will be able to reset all the restrictions imposed AGREEMENT, and will not appear other agreement. Russia has played a positive role in nuclear negotiations with both countries, especially with Iran: there, her role was crucial and is likely to remain significant if the United States decides to return to the AGREEMENT or to conclude a new agreement. And the United States and Russia are interested in the denuclearization of North Korea, so that here too there is potential for cooperation, if you start serious negotiations. Also, both countries are interested in technologies that help to increase nuclear potential of the DPRK and Iran, were not included in these countries. However, Russia controls the export of sensitive equipment and technologies with varying degrees of success.
Cooperation with third countries in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Thishour in various stages of development and operation of nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates and Turkey. In other countries, too, will be the motivation for the development of nuclear energy. Moscow already has a number of programs of international cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, are therefore relevant to the question of the adoption of stricter standards for the provision of third countries in order to enable them to conduct full nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and regeneration of fuel. Renewed dialogue should encompass consultations on the conditions of supply for nuclear energy, as well as for improving the safety of nuclear reactors and the search for solutions to the problem of nuclear waste.
USA, France and other countries to stop the export of nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes, and dominate in this market will be Russia (and China). It is unclear whether will take over the Moscow commitments and strengthen existing norms, but the emergence of new States with nuclear weapons is not in its interests.
on Strengthening regional security
Historically, the maintenance of stability and order in a multipolar world depended on the balance of forces in at least three geopolitically important regions: Europe, the Persian Gulf and northeast Asia. In the next ten years, Europe is likely to follow the path of separation of a single and powerful European bloc, and Moscow will try to benefit from its internal divisions. In such circumstances, the United States will have to come to the rescue Europe, and help split Europe in overcoming the contradictions and preserving the internal balance of power leaves little space for Russian-American cooperation. Nevertheless, you should discuss with the Russian representatives, how they imagine the end of a long period of stability in Europe — as well as their vision for the future of the territory.
As for East Asia, the Washington has seen a strengthening of the Russian-Chinese partnership. The rapprochement between Russia and China was facilitated by a number of foreign policy actions of the United States, including the military intervention in Kosovo, Iraq and Libya, which both countries have regarded as regime change, democracy promotion and support for color revolutions. Now Russia is helping to grow the power of China supply of advanced arms and military technology, and diplomatic support for China’s positions on North Korea and the South China sea. Subscribing to an asymmetric partnership with Beijing, Moscow is adaptable to the continuous strengthening of Chinese influence in Asia. A high probability that over time, Russia’s dependence on Chinese technology and investment will only grow. The Washington��well, at least avoid actions that push Russia and China to forge closer cooperation in areas that fall within the scope of American interests. In addition, there are areas of potential trilateral cooperation between the US, Russia and China: promoting the denuclearization of North Korea and the expansion of the activities of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to strengthen the Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
In the middle East Russian-American cooperation is possible in the Persian Gulf — both countries are keen not to let nuclear weapons fall into the hands of Iran and Saudi Arabia, and to achieve a balance between the two countries to neutralize their destructive and destabilizing struggle for regional supremacy. Washington and Moscow should unite to implement a long-term vision to which Russia has already shown interest in establishing a Russian-Arab cooperation forum: create new forum on security issues in the Persian Gulf, which would gather to discuss transnational issues of all key regional players, including Iran, and third party powers. The agenda of such a forum could include: Maritime security, trafficking in arms and other controlled goods, illegal migration, environmental remediation, water management, combating the effects of natural disasters, risk reduction, conflict management and dispute resolution, as well as measures to increase confidence in the field of military navigation.
the Competition in cyberspace
Ahead of Russia and the US for many years to unrestrained competition in cybersphere. As a rule, the arms race does not end good, and both countries are likely rapidly to build up their arsenals of cyberweapons. The US is likely to be more vulnerable than Russia, because of the higher economic and social dependence on the Internet. The conditions for formulating rules of conduct, control or (more likely) the confidence-building measures, as well as the emergence of common goals, for example in the field of security systems strategic operational management, will emerge soon. To leave the path that has already stood the two countries, will not be easy, unless there’s a tragedy that will force them to drastically change their positions. For both countries it is important to learn to build cooperation in cybersphere in competition.
to Expand economic and trade relations
The volume of bilateral trade between the US and Russia (for the year 2019 of about 28 billion dollars) is negligible compared to the volume of trade between the US and China (about 560 billion dollars in the same 2019). Prevailed in the 1990s and early 2000-ies the representatives��tion that the U.S. and Russia could develop a partnership in the energy sector on the basis of Russian oil, has lost relevance, since the United States became the world’s largest oil producer, and Russia is facing long-term decline in the energy sector. In the energy sector, the two countries — competitors rather than allies. The Russian economy is still not diversified, despite repeated promises to reform: hydrocarbons necessary, depending on the method of calculation, from 25 to 70 per cent of the GDP of the country16. Climate change, the development of green technologies and the growing number of producers of oil and gas do not promise a bright future for the Russian economy. It can save only large-scale diversification, but according to most experts, it’s not going to happen. In the absence of diversification, the prospects for expanding Russian-American trade and economic relations will remain vague. In addition, the structure of the two economies does not imply complementarity: countries compete in the export of oil, gas, agricultural products and weapons. If the situation does not change, to expand Russian-American trade, cooperation in economic projects in technology, energy, and space, and increase direct American investment in Russia will be extremely difficult.
the Conclusion
The first twenty-five years after the end of the cold war Russian-American relations consisted of competition and cooperation. In 2014, the balance has shifted to competition and, probably, still any time will remain at this point. Nevertheless, the global trends are likely at any time to change, as the political situation in each country, and these changes can open the door for increased cooperation. If we can use this opportunity will depend on the leadership qualities of the will, views and the courage of the leaders of the two States: they have to overcome the wall of mistrust and resistance of its citizens, politicians and Parliament. It’s time to wonder why the United States and Russia want from each other in the next ten years, what are the bilateral relations of these countries would like to come by the year 2030, and, if circumstances permit, how to elevate relations to the level that in the end would be valuable for US.
Gratitude
This publication was made possible through the generous support of Carnegie Corporation of New York. The present work reflects the judgement of the members of the working group, convened by the Carnegie endowment for international Peace to discuss the future of Russian-American relations. Not all members of the working group is ready to subscribe under each outlined in the article thought and done in her conclusions. Entirely for the content of the article meet the author.
Eugene Rumer — withthe oldest fellow and Director of Russian-Eurasian program of the Carnegie endowment. Before Rumer joined the Carnegie endowment, he served as national intelligence officer specializing in Russia and Eurasia, National intelligence Council USA (2010 to 2014), doing research at the National defense University, the International Institute for strategic studies and the RAND Corporation. Also worked in the U.S. Department of State, taught at Georgetown University and George Washington University.
Richard Sokolsky — visiting senior fellow in Russian and Eurasian program of the Carnegie endowment. Worked at the U.S. State Department under six different administrations. In the years of service in the state Department held the position of Director, division for arms control (1990 to 1997) and member of the Department of policy planning under Secretary of state (2005 to 2015). Also served as a senior researcher at the Carnegie endowment for international peace, the RAND Corporation and National defense University.
