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“His name was Leon…” – so we called the teacher a letter published in the April issue of “homeland” (N 4, 2020). School history teacher asked for help:

“Dear editors!

Students Kopanischenskaya school of the Ostrogozhsk district of Voronezh region are searching for the the scout scout and artillery spotter, which is from July to December 1942 in the village of Krinitsa (today Krinichenskaya rural settlement) passed on the command information of occupants coordinates for the location of headquarters, batteries, ammunition depots.

In December, signals the operator was intercepted by enemies and began his quest. In the course of the punitive operation the Nazis took hostages – Teens and young children. The villagers issued an ultimatum: take the scout, otherwise threatened to burn children in one of the houses. The threat worked. The Germans brutally tortured a spy and thrown into a ravine. According to the memoirs of rural inhabitants his name was Leon, it was probably a fake name. On hand was tattooed – Sergey.

After the expulsion of the Nazis from the village (17 January 1943) was investigated, which revealed the issuing of the underground. All participants in the criminal case were charged and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. In 1948, in the Spring came the father of the deceased scout. Met with residents, but to find the grave of his son could not.

We refer to “Homeland” with a request to help in the establishment of the personal data of the scout-the saboteur, his name, surname and place of birth, in order to set the obelisk in the place of his death.

With respect and hope for help

Podgorny, Natalya Antonovna, a history teacher Kopanischenskaya school”1.

needless to say that the editors could not start an investigation. Here are his first results.

the correspondent of “Rossiyskaya Gazeta” and “homeland” in the Voronezh region Anton Valagin immediately went on a business trip to the place of death scout. And soon informed the editor:

“In the center of the village kapanese Kapanese noteworthy unusual for these places a blue spruce. It was planted on the grave of a Hungarian soldier who died here in 1942. On Sunday, when the Magyars were in the service of the Church, equipped in the Russian Church, they were covered by Soviet artillery. Among the Hungarians there were two twin brothers. One died – he was buried under the pine, the second survived the winter of ‘ 43 was captured and eventually returned home.

turned the guns on the Magyar column which operated in the village Soviet spy named Paul. Within five months, he adjusted the shock cannons and night bombers, it was destroyed two artillery batteries and the German warehouse…

Official information about the Paul no. Established in ��barely version of the legend, he appeared in the village shortly before the arrival of the Germans – came with the refugees and found work in the stables. Knew German, and therefore has maintained a position at the occupants…”

Inconsistency in testimony – the teacher writes about Lena with tattoos “Sergei”, the journalist is talking about Paul made a logical assumption: we are talking about two different scouts. Leon-Sergei adjusted the fire of artillery from the village of Krinitsa, Paul, from the neighbouring village kapanese Kapanese. Armed with a precise map of the area, your columnist immersed himself in archival documents.

On the tragic situation at the beginning of July 1942, remembers the army General Mikhail Ilyich Kazakov, former chief of staff of the Voronezh front:

“July 3rd infantry division suffered heavy casualties in past battles, was shot down just occupied their positions and moved to the North-West of Voronezh.

…By the end of July 3 advanced armored units of the enemy reached the river don West of Voronezh. Directly fighting for Voronezh. …After hard fighting from 5 to 7 July, the German 4th Panzer army actually took the city. In our hands there are only suburbs of Troika and the Addition located on the East Bank of the Voronezh river and the campus on the Northern outskirts of the city. …Troops of the Voronezh front, a strong increase in reserves, began to build defense line of the don river, and the city in the river Voronezh.

…Voronezh front held before not less than thirty enemy divisions, which would be very useful to the German fascist command Stalingrad”2.

let us fix attention on the final sentence. In it lies the clue to the tragic fate of the unknown spies. The Voronezh front had to keep the German and Hungarian divisions in front of him and not give the enemy an opportunity to throw them under Stalingrad.

it was at this time the command of the Voronezh front was to obtain invaluable information from the reconnaissance, which consisted of Leon-Sergei and Pavel.

the Information was received within five months, which indicates a high professional level scouts. I assume the scout was abandoned or the Main intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General staff or intelligence staff of the Voronezh front3. Front at different periods commanded the generals understand perfectly the importance of intelligence: F. I. Golikov and N. F. Vatutin.

both of them had the opportunity to engage in the interests of the front high-level professionals. Before the war Lieutenant-General Golikov headed GRU4, and Lieutenant-General Vatutin was chief of operations and then the 1st Deputy chief of the General staff.

a lot of the challenges were and the chief of razvedatcase (RO) of the front staff, which was led by professional military intelligence officer Colonel Taras Korneev Fedotovich (1901-1984). He stood at the origins of Soviet signals intelligence. When he was chief of the intelligence staff of the Western front (among his subordinates – soon became legendary Zoe Kosmodemyanskaya) Colonel participated in the battle of Smolensk and the elimination of El’ninskogo the ledge of the enemy. Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov noted with satisfaction the achievements of Colonel Korneev. “Thanks to the measures taken for the improvement of intelligence command and staff of the front soon began to have a complete data about the enemy, his fire and engineering systems.

this information, as well as the testimony of many prisoners gave us the opportunity thoroughly to work out the plan of artillery fire, air strike and have specific tasks to units and formations for the complete defeat of the enemy here”5.

In the battle of Moscow in October 1941, thanks to the signals intelligence Colonel Korneev promptly opened the enemy, what with the pride later recalled: “the Main role in the detection of offensive groups was performed by the radio reconnaissance of the Western front. By the time the much more efficient steel aircraft and other types of intelligence, but superiority in the opening operational and tactical enemy reserves owned by the ESM”6.

In early March 1942, Korneev, in January was awarded the order of the red banner, was seriously wounded and a month later became chief of the 6th division of the 1st Directorate of the GRU. 1st Control was involved in human intelligence. The jurisdiction of the Department Colonel Korneev was the whole front, the army and the district intelligence.

July 12, 1942, the Colonel will receive a new assignment – become the head of the intelligence staff of the Voronezh front7. He had the opportunity to get together with a group of professionals. What the Colonel did.

let me Remind, that in July, the command began to receive information from the village of Krinitsa. And at the end of August the intelligence division of the front headquarters headed Korneev, was preserved in the Central archive of the Ministry of defense, “Report card on the opponent RO headquarters Worf according to 31.8.42 G.”8.

About the sources providing the information for plotting on the map, it was said vaguely: “According to credible…”

Point out a very important circumstance of time and place. Responsible decisions Rate in the atmosphere of secrecy and was not documented. “Supreme Commander doesn’t like to talk with him beyond his doors. Napoleon said that a secret is a secret, until he knows one person. Stalin knew the secret, and two, and three: he and those with whom the conversation was. But ifn, talking to someone of the companions, warned: “you know I do,” you can be sure: no one had the guts to tell anyone about the conversation held, and the secret remained a secret”9 – claimed Stalin’s favorite air Chief Marshal Alexander Evgenievich Golovanov. On the mechanism of making important decisions in Stalin’s office recalled and the Main Marshal of artillery Nikolay Nikolaevich Voronov:

“the Rate agreed that in order to observe complete secrecy during the initial period will not be issued for this reason directives and operational orders – all must be done by personal communication, oral instructions and legend on the operational maps,”10.

Colonel Korneev received an oral order to develop a detailed plan to deceive the enemy and in October he was introduced11. In CAMD, there remained four option top secret plan, filed in one archival file.

the Overall objective was formulated as follows: “to Hide the true group of troops of the Voronezh front, and by holding set forth below deception activities, to show the enemy the concentration of a powerful group of our troops on the southern wing of the front”12. None of the generals and officers who took part in events of misinformation, wasn’t supposed to know the whole plan in General. This important fact has been especially emphasized Korneev: “the Performers are aware of the plan only the part that directly concerns him”13.

of Course, could not know about this plan and their role in its implementation, front-line intelligence officers working behind enemy lines. Everything had to be extremely reliable. Korneev wanted to “show the enemy about the concentration of large tank formations”14. A major expert in the ESM tried to convince the Germans that on the Voronezh front troops of the red Army is preparing a major offensive.

we List a few of the points from the plan of Colonel Korneev:

“about the Organization of networks in the settlements.

Podroska false documents on the basis of the plan for the upcoming offensive.

the Sharp increase in the activity of our intelligence.

the Intensification of military intelligence night and day, podroska documents new parts that are not in fact”15.

the Finishing touch of a plan to deceive the enemy was to boost the activities of reconnaissance, regularly for a period of five months to deliver in front of the headquarters of a very important intelligence.

somewhere among our Lenya-Sergei and Pavel.

Their information was not price. But in order to convince the enemy that on the Voronezh front is preparing an offensive, the scouts were ordered to hand “coordinates of location of headquarters, batteries, warehouses beepipasumi”. This kind of small information – of course, not their level. Professionals of such a high-class required for a major. But orders are orders. Scouts price was too high and ordered executed.

their lives.

3 January 1943 the headquarters of the Voronezh front was attended by representatives of the Rate – Deputy Supreme Commander Zhukov and the chief of the General staff A. M. Vasilevsky. Prepared the January offensive from Voronezh to Kursk (with the defeat of the Hungarians and the 2nd German army). At the headquarters of the General of the army Zhukov met his old friend Colonel Korneev. “The enemy was reported by the chief of intelligence of the front. He knew well enough the grouping and character of the enemy’s defense, and because all its conclusions were adopted without objection”16.

January 25, 1943 on the Voronezh were hoisted a victorious Red banner, although the battle for the city lasted until 2 February. The Voronezh called “the second Stalingrad” or “Stalingrad on the don”. Exactly 2 February 1943 was successfully completed, the battle of Stalingrad.

on 14 February Colonel Korneev was awarded the order of Lenin – the highest award of the country. Made them a strategic disinformation operation, deeply classified. And hardly anyone would remember the nameless heroes-the scouts don’t get unexpected publicity details of their deaths.

17 Dec 1951 held a session of the Military Tribunal. Judged those who gave scout Paul Rybalkina, V. F., Picolino Rubanov A. S. and T. G. From the case followed:

“Rybalkin in court showed that at the beginning of January 1943, all residents of the village well, the occupiers gathered at the village Council building, counted 50 people, among which was that he, Rybalkin, announced their hostages, and said that all the hostages would be shot if the villagers do not say, where is the transmitter, after which the hostages were placed under guard in the house Putilina. When he was in the house, to him, Rybalkinu came Rubanov T. and said he intends to call a Hungarian officer and tell him about the activities of prisoner of war Paul and then all the hostages will be freed. He and Lissitzky agreed with the proposal Rubanov, the three of them were taken to the commandant’s office, which also brought the prisoner Paul. Rubanov told the commander that Paul offered to set fire to the stables with the horses. He Rybalkin, confirmed that, in addition, informed the commandant that Paul spoke of the invincibility of the Soviet Army. After that the three of them returned to the house Putilina, and a few days later all hostages were released and announced that a radio transmitter was discovered in another village”17.

All three were tried for treason and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, and Vasily Fedorovich Rybalkin, born in 1924, native of the village of Krinitsa, ��previously convicted, was sentenced to “25 years in labor camps with disenfranchisement for a period of 5 years and with confiscation of property”18. The Tribunal did not consider it a mitigating circumstance that after the liberation of the village of Krinitsa Rybalkin was drafted into the Red Army, fought bravely in the artillery Reserve of the Main Command and in battle earned their soldier awards: order of the red Star and medals “For courage”, “For victory over Germany” and “For liberation of Prague”. And in 1985, will receive the order of the Patriotic war II degree.

the Daughter Rybalkina many years achieved the rehabilitation of his father. Only on 20 January 2003, held the Supreme Court of Russian Federation N 14-Д02-31. The verdict in the case of treason against Rybalkina was cancelled, the criminal case was dismissed on the basis of paragraph 2 part 1 article 24 UPK the Russian Federation behind absence in act of structure of a crime19. Regarding the two other convicts, the sentence was not revised.

Who is he, Basil Rybalkin, – traitor or a victim of tragic circumstances? The Supreme Court finally answered this question only in the legal plane. Moral judgment everyone puts himself – and the choice of the future decorated, and feat of the two boys, whose names we will probably never know.

1. His name was Leon… // homeland. 2020. N 4. P. 10.

2. Kazakov M. I. Above the map of past battles. M.: Voenizdat, 1971. S. 111-112, 113-114.

3. October 23, 1942 by order of the Commissar of defense I. V. Stalin’s GRU was transferred from the jurisdiction of the General staff directly subordinate to the people’s Commissar of defense. The GRU was assigned the management of all human intelligence and subversive activities both abroad and in the occupied territory of the USSR. At the same time in the composition of the General staff was formed, the Office of military intelligence of the General staff, which supervised the work of frontline intelligence reconnaissance. Conduct human intelligence of a newly formed management was prohibited.

4. GRU before the war was called the 5th running of the red army.

5. Zhukov, G. K. Reminiscences and reflections. In 2 t. T. 1. M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2002. P. 357.

6. P. Shmyrev, General-Lieutenant. Sentinels of the air (about the history of SIGINT) // Red star. 2004. March 18 // http://www.radioscanner.ru/info/article69/. In the years 1971-1987 Petr Spiridonovich Shmyrev was the head of the 6th Directorate of the GRU of the General staff (Radio – electronic intelligence).

7. Yaruhin Y. M. The Great Patriotic War. The intelligence chiefs of the fronts, armies, fleets, fleets. Kiev: Military intelligence, 2013. P. 171.

8. TSAMO. F. 203. Op. 2843. D. 164.

9. Golovanov A. E. long-range bomber… Moscow: Delta NB, 2004. P. 106.

10. Voronov N. N. In the service of the military. M.: Voenizdat, 1963. P. 255.

11. TSAMO. F. 236. Op. 2673. D. 130. L. 51.

12. Ibid. L. 53.

13. Ibid. L. 54.

14. Ibid. L. 51.

15. Ibid. L. 45-47.

16. Kazakov M. I. The Decree. CIT. p. 147.

17. Judicial Board on criminal cases of the Supreme Court: Definition from December 17, 1951, Case No. 14-д02-31 // http://sudrf.kodeks.ru/rospravo/document/885141017.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

1

Spy.

2

Schema of the Voronezh-Kastornoye operation. 1943.

3

the Village of Krinitsa village kapanese Kopania South-East from the front line – worked here the scouts from the group of Taras Korneev.

4

Hungarian army near Voronezh. 1942.

5

Lieutenant-General N. F. Vatutin.

6

Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov.

7

November 17, 1943, Colonel T. F. Korneev became a major-General.

8

the Unknown heroes Lenya and Paul knew only Colonel Korneev.

9

the attack of the Soviet Il-2. 1943.

10

Offensive at Voronezh. 1943.

11

local Historian Vladimir Rubanov: “In the ravine dropped the body of the murdered scout Laziness-Sergey?”

12

Teacher Natalya Podgorny on the place where was supposedly killed Paul.