Not only the war in Ukraine is deadlocked. There is also little movement on the political-diplomatic front. There is a lack of prominent voices pointing out ways out. Statements such as those made by Saxony’s Prime Minister Kretschmer and ex-Chancellor Schröder were cross shots.
The situation seems hopeless. After the Russian aggression, Ukraine initially succeeded in achieving what many considered impossible: the Kremlin’s attempt to conquer the country with multiple pincers and subsequently to establish a puppet regime failed.
At the same time, the Kremlin de facto redefined its war strategy and now focused on three goals: supporting the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” recognized by Putin, creating a land corridor to Crimea, and cutting off any access to the sea for Ukraine, which is being relegated to a rump state target.
Since then, the battered country has been caught up in a costly war of attrition that has already claimed tens of thousands of lives on both sides.
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Not only is the military situation deadlocked, there is also little new to report diplomatically. But what are the perspectives? Three camps can be roughly identified. One relies on a military victory for Ukraine.
It wants to at least push Russia back to the status quo ante, compared to the situation before February 24, but if possible also, as the American Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin made clear, weaken it for the long term. These “hawks” are opposed to the “doves”.
They hope that the war will end soon through concessions to Russian security interests, as perceived by the Kremlin, i.e.: openness to acknowledging territorial losses (at least with regard to Crimea), restraint in the armament of Ukraine, the prospect of a relaxation of western sanctions .
This should pave the way for negotiations or at least “freeze” the conflict, i.e. a ceasefire should be reached without any prospects for a political solution being foreseeable.
Between the two camps there is a third position. She considers a military victory for one side or the other to be largely unlikely. There is much to be said for this sober assessment. However, it can also easily lead to helplessness if it is not linked to concrete perspectives for action.
Are there any ways out of the impasse? The American conflict researcher I. William Zartman has emphasized the importance of timing in negotiations and mediation efforts. According to his theory, wars are only “ripe” for attempts at settlement when both sides are faced with a painful stalemate and ways out are discernible.
If Zartman is right, things look bleak. Because the Kremlin, despite high losses of its own, is emphasizing its options for escalating the war. And the Ukrainian government is committing its people to far-reaching war aims, which also include recapturing Crimea.
In order to get out of this stalemate, Russia would have to be made aware that sanctions against the regime and arms aid to Ukraine will only end if there are serious negotiations and at least a partial withdrawal of Russian troops. And Ukraine should not be encouraged to wager on unrealistic war targets.
There is no “one” solution to the conflict. At the same time, however, some cornerstones for negotiations can be identified, for which one can already prepare today:
First, confidence in Moscow’s sincerity has been shattered after a multitude of blatant lies. Prudent steps such as the exchange of prisoners of war, the repatriation of the remains of killed soldiers and humanitarian agreements are necessary to achieve an absolute minimum of expectation reliability.
The agreement that has now been implemented and mediated by Turkey on the delivery of grain by sea is a cautiously positive sign, even if Russia thwarted it right from the start by attacking the port of Odessa.
Second, a ceasefire will require monitoring and verification mechanisms, as well as guarantor powers. This is where influential countries like China or India, which have so far kept a low profile, could come into play. The United Nations, largely marginalized in this war, would also have to assume their intended roles via the UN Security Council or the OSCE.
Thirdly, in all likelihood, Ukraine will become armed neutral, which, in addition to the prospect of joining the EU, also needs reliable security guarantees, although these are likely to be below the threshold of Article 5 of the NATO treaty.
Fourth, an agreement on the status of Crimea and the two self-proclaimed people’s republics in the Donbass region is unlikely to be reached in the short term. Against this background, we must be prepared for these conflicts to be “frozen” – as was the case in the post-Soviet space, for example in Abkhazia (Georgia) or Transnistria (Moldova).
However, a timetable and regulated procedures are needed for the next 10 or 15 years. The cases of South Ossetia (Georgia) and Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) have shown that frozen wars can quickly become hot again.
Fifth, finally, the ‘negotiation pie’ needs to be enlarged to provide incentives to break out of the stalemate. This includes reconstruction aid for Ukraine. Above all, however, despite the icy climate, mutual security agreements between NATO and Russia will be necessary, which include the stationing of troops and weapon systems.
Prof. Dr. Tobias Debiel is Deputy Director of the Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) at the University of Duisburg-Essen. In his research, he deals, among other things, with crisis prevention, violent conflicts and the reconstruction of war-torn societies.
In order to help the sober position out of its perplexity, a public debate on options to get out of the war of attrition is desirable. It will be important who gets involved from politics. The last few weeks have not been very promising.
Because it was primarily politicians who dared to come out from under cover who lacked the necessary authority in these questions. For example, when Saxony’s Prime Minister Michael Kretschmer calls for the war to be “frozen”, he tends to focus more on German sensitivities than on the situation on the ground.
And ex-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has overstated his sympathy for Vladimir Putin to such an extent that he is not credible even in places where he could be thought-provoking (e.g. on Ukraine’s armed neutrality and the status of the Donbass republics).
All-round outrage was justified in this respect, but it doesn’t help anyone unless realistic alternatives are named. It might be too early for negotiations at the moment. However, the time is definitely “ripe” for a more differentiated debate.
