https://im.kommersant.ru/Issues.photo/DAILY/2020/131M/KVR_001443_00033_1_t218_195900.jpg

Postepidemic the development of global value chains (GVCs) in the world will create in the coming years, new risks for Russia, not too active ustraivatsya in them since 2000, but will open new opportunities for development, suggested in the report on the future of GVCs researchers from the Higher school of Economics (HSE). We offer ways to adapt to these changes that are already OECD refers to as “the great fragmentation” in world trade, is a priority to support the global platforms of e-commerce for the export of Russian support production robotics and complex measures to support small and medium enterprises (SMEs) focused on export markets.A team of researchers from the HSE, presented in July by working group of Association of European business modernisation and innovation report, which shows one of the first attempts at a comprehensive assessment of changes in GVCs after the shock coronavirus pandemic 2020 and a possible strategy of adaptation to changes in the economy of the Russian Federation. The work prepared by the Center for structural policy studies, the authors Yuri Simachev, Anna Fedyunina and Mikhail Kuzyk — they also made some recommendations for state regulation and proactive measures of the government, which could contribute to this adaptation and have reduced the risks to players in Russia at the alleged transformation of the GRDC.In the report problems GRDC for Russia is considered in quite a wide term (evaluated in the number of episodes changes after events in 1998, 2008 and 2014-2015) and partly associated with the hypothesis of a “middle income trap”, and in a wide definition: the authors suggest that since 2000, the integration into global production chains of Russian companies was “one-sided”, the complexity of the economy almost did not happen, a symptom of being in “the trap” is a specialization of Russia in global GVCs on a separate complex products with no signs of structural changes. The current shock to the GRDC in the HSE assessed as comparable to the situation in 1998, however, according to the estimations, in 2004 the complexity of the export basket of the Russian Federation was falling until 2014, when it had a positive impact of the devaluation of the ruble; after 2020 this factor to act probably won’t. In ascending links GRDC 82% of Russia’s participation in them provide three industries: ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, chemical industry. RF while descending links in GVCs is strongly dependent on imports of value added, but industries are intensely involved in the chain, with three major “hubs,” no.Analysis of updates of country positions in GVCs, 2005-2015, organized by the school, shows some progress in motion “from raw material to processing” along with South Africa (in agriculture, textile and wood processing industry), the movement towards high value added along with China, India and several Eastern Euro��s (chemical industry and building materials production), but not in motion towards innovation intensive industries.As successful examples of adaptation to overall changes GRDC HSE leads the same industry (chemical industry, forestry, food processing), limited effects have also been observed in the automotive and textile industry. Almost all these industries played an important role in direct uninvestible, the problem is the high dependence of industries from import of components, including high-tech, the most critical it is priced for the automotive industry, chemical industry and pharmaceuticals.The authors, relying in particular on the June OECD report on “postaveni” trends in global trade, suggest that the pandemic would accelerate the long process of transition from the “great integration” with the overall growth GRDC to “the great fragmentation”. Failures at the global logistics in 2020, different sectors are expected to react differently. In the three reaction models are already using platform solutions, the company will continue to boost the globalization of operations in searching worldwide backup and alternative suppliers (more stable States in operation, providers that use the technology industrie 4.0), overall it strategy of equipment suppliers and electronics. Medium – and low-tech industries are more prone to the substitution of suppliers and optimization of GVCs (this is the strategy for the food, textile industries, building materials). Finally, for industries that significantly impact the pandemic (pharmaceuticals, PPE) will be characterized by “reshoring,” the localization of production, increase control over the chain and search providers “at arm’s length”. The authors also warn that future scenarios will affect the willingness of national governments to use the pandemic as a protectionist pretext. The uniqueness of coronavirus crisis creates a lot of non-standard arguments against a quick recovery of GVCs affecting Russia and the overall recovery of world trade.The authors see three main opportunities for Russia in the coming years in this situation. First — a quick “platform” integration into GVCs, using platforms of e-commerce. The second strategy robotization of production and the introduction of additive, CAD/CAM technology: it strategy, which is now actively engaged in the Czech Republic, Germany and Hungary; to a lesser extent, France and the United States; economy of the Russian Federation on indicators of this advancement associated with imports of the product concerned, similar to the economy of Australia; developing countries are generally less active in this area. Finally, a third possibility is diversification of commodity exports and the promotion of exports of SMEs.Note that all three options considered by the government of the Russian Federation prioritymi. However, the proposed HSE structural policies in the sight of GVCs is more complicated than implemented now. Among other recommendations, the stimulation of industries with a short cycle of investment, including in SMEs, the formation of a “national fragments” GRDC, the promotion of inter-sectoral cooperation, support an indirect export. While “connecting” state investment, stimulating the growth of complexity in the export sector, and proactive action mainstream in the practice of state support can not be considered — the effect of them is rather long and is estimated more difficult than from direct support to export.Dmitry Butrin