Well remember how intense the struggle was at the turn of XX and XXI centuries for the preservation of the ABM Treaty. The Russian side was ready to make serious concessions in order to convince Washington to keep the Contract. In favor of the maintenance and observance of the ABM Treaty made the vast majority of countries in the world. In defense of the Contract was adopted the corresponding resolution of the UN General Assembly, which voted in only four States. Nevertheless the contract could not be saved: in summer 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from him. Later the same fate befell the CFE Treaty and the INF Treaty. I must admit that the struggle for their preservation was not as intense as in the case of the ABM Treaty. Yes, Russia at the highest political level advocated for their preservation but beyond this principled position did not get. European States, the security interests of which were directly associated with these contracts and who at one time enthusiastically supported them, actually sided with the position of Washington and listlessly gazed at eliminating them.
Prepared whether the new start Treaty the same fate? Now, perhaps, it would be premature to predict his fate. However, already today it is obvious that even in case of renewal of this contract to restore the extensive and multi-layered legal framework of arms control that had evolved over decades in the second half of the last century and served the interests of strategic stability in the world, it will be almost impossible. If you agree with this picture of the current reality, there arise two practical questions. First, it is necessary to admit that traditional control over nuclear and conventional weapons to the beginning of the third decade of the XXI century cannot be repaired? Second, what mechanisms of arms control in General is possible in the new evolving international environment?
it is Obvious that a significant share of responsibility for the collapse of the international system of arms control are the United States. After the end of the cold war, Washington, imagines himself the winner, has openly committed itself to eliminating those international mechanisms which, in the opinion of several us administrations, would somehow limit their freedom in the international arena, and in fact – to prevent American dominance in the world.
the United States unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty and the INF Treaty, opposed ratification of the member States of NATO of the adapted CFE Treaty, evaded constructive dialogue in other areas of arms control. In this sense, the signing of the Contract EHV-III in 2010 was the exception of these��common trends.
however, it would be a dangerous simplification of the blame for the current state of Affairs in the field of arms control rest solely on the United States. One cannot ignore the fact that after the end of the cold war, the world ceased to be bipolar including the global nuclear threat. The emphasis in the field of security began to move from the global level to the regions and individual countries. At the same time began to change and the scale of priorities of security threats, among which the focus was thrown on combating terrorism, various forms of extremism, drug trafficking, illegal migration, etc.
In these circumstances, the international community’s response to the nuclearization of India and Pakistan, although he was condemning, but not enough to stop it. This can be explained only by the fact that the emergence of these countries ‘ missile and nuclear weapons, though there was a direct violation of the non-proliferation regime, was perceived in the world as a direct threat to global security, but rather as a regional problem. Probably, it should be recognized that the blame for this state of Affairs are in one way or another all members of the “nuclear five”, are both permanent members of the UN Security Council.
half a century history of nuclear arms control looks like these days all the more disappointing. In the form in which we knew him since the first agreements signed half a century ago, Leonid Brezhnev and Richard Nixon, the control is coming to its natural end. Recent destructive steps of the administration trump probably accelerated the sad denouement and gave it some extra drama, but this outcome was somehow inevitable. Back in the 70-ies of the last century, or even in 2010, when Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama signed start-3, in any case will not work.
on the other hand, it is hard to imagine that in the world there are Nations interested in nothing and nobody limited the nuclear arms race. “Game without rules” in this field too risky, and with each new decade of the XXI century, if not with each passing year, the risks will only increase. Therefore, some new mechanisms of strategic arms control should be sprouting through the jumble of the wreckage of the old bilateral Soviet-American system.
Today, probably no one can predict what exactly will these new mechanisms. More understandable, as they probably will not.
In the past, remain the format of bilateral strategic arms control. The United States expresses more concern over the development of China’s nuclear Arsenal, ballisticswho potential of Iran, etc. Russia also somehow have to take into account the growing possibilities of formal and informal members of the “nuclear club”, apart from the USA. Accordingly, the bilateral Russian-American format should be one way or another converted into a multilateral format. The task is not trivial, but anyway to do it the decision will have.
the Future of the agreement is unlikely to be a traditional, legally binding and subject to ratification of treaties. To ratify any international agreement today is extremely complex, and in many cases simply impossible. Especially assuming that we still have to go through a historically long period of sharp confrontation between the world’s leading players. What in these conditions can be given assurances the parties fulfill the agreements reached? As shows experiment of the INF Treaty, and the ABM Treaty, even legally binding agreements do not give such guarantees from any such agreement can be quickly to go by a simple formal procedure.
we Can also assume that the center of future negotiations on strategic arms control are unlikely to be the quantitative parameters of nuclear arsenals of the Contracting parties. Quantitative arms race – the type of which was conducted by the Soviet Union and the United States in the second half of the last century, unlikely to be repeated in this century. The main concern of the negotiators are not quantitative, but qualitative characteristics of the strategic arsenals – such as, for example, the growing use in this field of artificial intelligence elements.
regarding the format of the negotiations and possible agreements in the future more demand will be not the traditional bilateral model, and a more flexible multilateral formats of type Joint comprehensive plan of action (AGREEMENT ) – agreement on Iranian nuclear dossier 2015. Of course, even this format, as you can see does not guarantee the implementation of agreements, however it allows to find solutions around which to unite a broad range of States and thus to lower the level of tension.
Perhaps in the future the term “arms control” will require revision. To place legally binding, predominantly quantitative “arms control” can come from multilateral, informal, mostly qualitative, “managing strategic weapons.” In this new coordinate system a very important role will be played by the presence of numerous lines of communications are not only higher, non the other levels, the rapid exchange of military information, a comparison of military doctrines.
In the nuclear world is entering a new era. This world is becoming more complex, less predictable and potentially more dangerous than leaving in the past world of the twentieth century. I would like to hope that Russia, USA, other leading players will be able to rise above mutual suspicion and accusations, be aware of the level of increasing risks and focus their efforts on the search for new models and new algorithms for reducing nuclear risks and the strengthening of strategic stability at the global and regional levels. Russia has the strength to become one of the leaders of this historical process. Our country has unique experience in developing and using a variety of mechanisms of arms control, a long tradition of Soviet and Russian school of international relations and negotiators, well-preserved community of highly qualified experts on strategic weapons.
