The Russian army is being pushed back further and further in Ukraine. The warfare is dividing Putin’s apparatus of power. The mobilization enrages Russian citizens. Problem after problem for the President. He is caught in 7 self-imposed traps.
Putin maneuvered himself into 7 traps.
1. His new supreme commander cannot do anything on the battlefield. And Putin is just emptying his arsenal of weapons.
2. Putin fails to satisfy his inner circle of power. The cracks keep getting bigger. Only success can heal them.
3. Putin had a contract with its citizens. He wages his war, the people are not affected by it. The fact that he has now broken this becomes a problem.
4. Putin’s power backing from the regional leaders is crumbling. Instead of relying on his system, the elites are now forming their own alliances.
5. Putin makes himself open to blackmail through the war. He needs the help of regional leaders. But they also know how to use it.
6. Putin is slipping control of the regions. That’s why the gangster mentality of the pre-Putin era is reestablishing itself among Russian businessmen.
7. Putin’s power is not really in danger yet. But all these factors narrow the scope of his power.
Vladimir Putin experiences a series of defeats in Ukraine. The Russian President currently has many problems to overcome. In a guest article for the New York Times, British military historian and political expert Mark Galeotti analyzes that Putin has maneuvered himself into seven traps.
Galeotti writes that Putin recently appointed Sergei Surovikin – nicknamed “General Armageddon” – as the new supreme commander for Ukraine. But Surovikin, described as competent and cruel, can do next to nothing. The Ukrainians are on the rise. And the freshly mobilized Russian soldiers come to the front without training and without motivation. In the best case, they could hold the positions, says Galeotti. An offensive is out of the question.
In addition, Putin is emptying the arsenal of weapons. The savage bombardments of Ukrainian cities are of no strategic use. But the stockpile of missiles is dwindling and difficult to replace. Estimates assume that more than half of the Russian weapons were already used in the war – including 80 percent of the powerful Iskander systems. Galeotti writes: “The military leadership is in a state of agitation. They want to hold back a strategic reserve – for a new offensive, or at least against a new Ukrainian attack.”
There are (at least) two nationalist camps in Putin’s inner circle: the military elite (“siloviki”) and the veterans. For a long time, Putin managed to pacify both sides. But now the two are in conflict: the hardliners around Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov want a tougher war – even the use of nuclear weapons. They accuse the technocrats, gathered behind Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, of having a style of war that is too old-fashioned and reserved.
Putin tries to please both groups. And he doesn’t succeed with anyone. Galeotti believes that the wild bombings are primarily intended to show hardliners that Putin is a tough dog. But in the end he needs successes that are currently far and wide not in sight.
Read more about how the Russian military elite “Siloviki” put Putin in a dangerous dilemma here
The agreement between Vladimir Putin and the Russians was clear: “I am fighting this war for you. But you won’t have anything to do with it.” That went well for months. In Ukraine, Putin primarily burned members of ethnic minorities, men from the countryside. But with the recent mobilization, the war has arrived in the heart of Russia. Every man suddenly runs the risk of having to go to war. Any family can be suddenly affected.
Putin canceled the contract. And not just this one. According to Galeotti, the president also had a contract with the regional princes of Russia. It read: “You keep things calm. I’ll leave you alone for that.” But now Putin is suddenly calling for troops and tightening the thumbscrews financially. The regional leaders have to do Putin’s dirty work instead of looking after their own interests. “It becomes a problem for the Kremlin,” said Galeotti.
The division indicated in point 3 goes even further, writes the military historian. The regions have always been important. After taking power in 1999, Putin tried to gain control of this chaotic state, Galeotti said. Through wars and political games, he managed to secure support and make it an important pillar of power. But now that support is crumbling.
Because the regional rulers are moving further and further away from the Kremlin. They tried to do as little for the war as possible. And at the same time they try to find out for themselves what is possible. Galeotti quotes from an internal report by the “Investigatory Committee” – quasi the Russian FBI: There is a clear increase in infidelity of the regional elites. “In a time of national need, some officials are focused on protecting their own interests and forging their own alliances with businessmen and criminals in their area.”
The regional leaders are becoming a problem for Putin for another reason, according to Galeotti. At first the Kremlin ignored the wishes of the regions. Do what we say, so the announcement. But now those in power are realizing how dependent they are on the regional elites. And the sovereigns are suddenly demanding something in return for their efforts.
For example, Alexander Dyumin, the governor of the Tula region and Putin’s former bodyguard. According to Galeotti, he has been eyeing a post in Moscow for a long time. Now he constantly emphasizes how well his weapons production for the war is going. He wants to go to the Department of Defense. And Putin should regulate that.
Or Chechen leader Kadyrov. Its brutal troops play an important role in the war. That gives him power. Above all, he wants to make more money for his region. And now and then threatens to withdraw his troops from the war. Putin can only give in to his demands – or mess with Kadyrov. So far, the Kremlin has always backed down in these disputes, says Galeotti.
Putin has launched a war that is also weakening the financial situation. And so, according to Galeotti, the distribution struggles in Russia begin – and in a supposedly faded gangster way. Recently, for example, very rich Russians have died again and again, sometimes in mysterious ways. “Murder is a business tactic again,” writes Galeotti. That was last the case in the 1990s, in the pre-Putin era.
Meanwhile, oil tycoon Rustam Minnikhanov wants to survive somehow. Galeotti reports how the Tatarstan region’s leader tries to please everyone from hardliner Kadyrov to technocrat Shoigu. One observer says: “Minnikhanov does not know where the knife will come from.”
Putin needs to get a grip on these fights somehow. Otherwise his whole system of power is in jeopardy.
Mark Galeotti writes: “Despite all these things, Putin’s power is not in immediate danger. Most of the regional princes are still behind him. There is no open opposition.” But all the power struggles exposed the weaknesses of the one-man power system and are signs that Putin has lost his nose.
According to the political expert, the regional elites are concentrating on their livelihoods because they are not sure that Putin can continue to guarantee them stability. And the Kremlin is having a hard time seeing through everything. A lot of money – for example for mobilization – seeps away in the regions. But nobody knows exactly where – also because the regional elites cover each other.
Galeotti’s trap conclusion: “Putin is trapped because he has to keep the vociferous hardliners and the disgruntled technocrats happy at the same time. His room for maneuver as a strongman is just as limited as his room for maneuver on the battlefield right now.”