Imagine a normal life situation, particularly relevant for the changeable summer this year. Going to spend the coming summer weekends outdoors, on Saturday morning you look out the window and angrily to and fro lingering in the sky leaden clouds, fix frequent flashes of lightning on the horizon and catch the approaching thunder. Yes, of course, yesterday, forecasters warned of variable cloudiness with possible rain, but yesterday I really wanted to hope that the rains will be a party. But, according to Murphy’s law, not passed!In such a situation, you have a whole range of possible solutions, including two extreme options. On the one hand, you can call the mayor’s office, the government or the presidential administration and require urgent lift into the air a dozen aircraft for immediate dispersal of rain clouds. On the other hand, you can try to convince yourself that you don’t want to be dragged into the weekend battered the road somewhere to the devil horns, much nicer to spend the weekend lying on the sofa in the company of your favorite series and accompanying TV series beer and chips.About the same divided position of the Russian experts a year ago, when light clouds in the field of arms control, turned into a storm, that is, when a hypothetical future release of the presidential administration of the USA of Donald trump from the Treaty on intermediate and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty) has become a political reality — August 2, 2019, the contract is gone. On one end of the spectrum were those who advocated the salvation of the Treaty at any cost, by any means. Defenders of the INF Treaty said that his death would entail a variety of serious negative consequences — will trigger a new arms race, undermine strategic stability not only in Europe but throughout the world, will lead to a chain reaction of destruction of other bilateral and multilateral treaties in the field of security.Read nextin other end of the spectrum located either explicit or implicit criticism of the Treaty. According to them, the INF Treaty at the moment of the signature at the end of 1987, did not meet the interests of Moscow, was a major mistake of the General Secretary of the CPSU Mikhail Gorbachev and foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, giving a significant one-sided advantages to the United States. And for thirty years the INF Treaty and generally have time hopelessly outdated, particularly given building arsenals of intermediate-range and shorter-range third countries close to the Russian borders. Therefore, the termination should not be dramatized — something Russia will lose, but in something and win, especially with the availability of advanced domestic developments in the creation of the media range.As you can see, the Russian��traveler, the official line was the lowest common denominator between these polar points of view. Of course, there is no reason to trust the memoirs of former US presidential Advisor for national security John Bolton, stating that in conversation with him, the Minister of defence of Russia Sergey Shoigu allegedly admitted that the INF Treaty “has lost its usefulness.” The Russian position on the Treaty is well known and is devoid of ambiguity. Nevertheless, the impression is that Moscow has not fought for the preservation of the INF Treaty so clearly, imaginatively and energetically as she fought for the preservation of the ABM Treaty two decades earlier. However, the clouds failed to disperse and in 2001-2002 — despite all the efforts of Moscow and support for these efforts from the international community, the administration of George W. Bush still came out of the ABM Treaty and launched the process of destruction of bilateral models of strategic stability.The past year has not made clear in the debate between defenders and critics of the INF Treaty agreement. Not to say that immediately after the failure of the US the INF Treaty, the world was on the brink of nuclear war, or that in Europe, immediately began an uncontrolled nuclear arms race. Mitigating the impact of the exit of the administration of the tramp from the Treaty, the U.S. Congress adopted defence budget for 2020 prudently forbade the Pentagon to purchase and deploy new land-based missiles of medium and shorter-range missiles.However, the alarmists were right in saying that a chain reaction of disintegration of the old system of strategic stability will have a powerful additional impetus. In may 2020, the White house announced the decision to withdraw from the Treaty on open skies. Every month more and more elusive became the prospects for renewal of the Contract start-3. Rumors about the possible resumption of United States nuclear tests, as well as about the unilateral revision of the U.S. obligations under the Regime of control over missile technology (MTCR). In these conditions many politicians and experts welcomed the postponement of the next Review conference of the Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) in the spring 2020 spring 2021 conference could be an epic fiasco.I must admit that the events of recent months have diverted attention from arms control, which previously was not particularly close. Regular bursts of military action in Syria and Libya, a sharp and unexpected drop in world oil prices that triggered the global recession, the worsening of American-Chinese contradictions and, finally, the pandemic coronavirus that causes it was politically more significant than the consequences of the collapse of the INF Treaty, or the prospect of expiration of the start-3 without him extension. For the past year and in the United States and in Russia, the priorities of national leaders increasingly shifted towards domestic issues and challenges. The inglorious finale of the INF Treaty is increasingly perceived not as a tragic failure of the established system, but as a historical inevitability, as the next Chapter in the long and sad chronicle of the destruction of the foundations of the global strategic stability. Not the first Chapter, but not the last.Even if we manage by some miracle in the next few months to disperse the political clouds and save the start-3, this is not going to revive the Soviet-American model of arms control, established almost half a century ago. Timid hope that the likely victory of Joe Biden for the presidential election in November something will change for the better, in our opinion, are without sufficient grounds. Already for the reason that under President Biden political relations of Washington with Moscow and with Beijing will not be conducive to achieving any breakthrough agreements on security issues. In addition, today it is easy to predict that after the November elections, the United States will remain a deeply divided government, which greatly complicate any coherent U.S. approach to arms control.As rightly pointed out, the great American economist John Kenneth Galbraith, in politics the choice is usually not between good and bad, and between unpleasant and fatal. It would, of course, well cause the aircraft to disperse the gathering clouds and the restoration in full of all past achievements of arms control, including the INF Treaty, ABOUT, DON, the CFE Treaty and reaffirm the enduring value of the start-3, of the NPT, the MTCR, GWAZI etc. But the appearance in the sky saving aircraft will have to wait a long time; the current politicians simply lack the motivation to burn his scarce political kerosene in the fight with storm clouds. Too many other problems and concerns, including economic crisis, climate change, international migration and the impacts of the pandemic coronavirus. Arms control — alas! — has long lost its former Central issue of world politics, and it somehow have to be reconciled.But lying on the couch with a beer and a bag of chips, carefully pretending to “not feel like” that we will live well, and no arms control at all— also not the best way out of the situation. The temptation of the “nuclear sovereignty” and “strategic autonomy” and even “strategic isolationism” without any restrictions, definitely great for all nuclear powers. For some players is the hope to win in an uncontrolled arms race due to superior resources or technology BA��s. For others — the ability to guarantee the effectiveness of “asymmetric” retaliation under any hypothetical scenario of a nuclear collision. For the third — calculations to at least partially neutralize unfavourable to them, the ratio of nuclear capabilities by maintaining a situation of “strategic uncertainty” in relation to their capabilities and intentions. However, all these hopes, possibilities and calculations are nothing more than a Mirage, an ephemeral illusion. The old Maxim that we cannot ensure our own security at the expense of security of others, for all its banality, remains true for the twenty-first century. Uncontrolled arms race is not only the constantly growing material costs, but also and growing risks.To confidently move into the future, the leaders of nuclear countries first, we have to admit their mistakes and errors of the recent past. History generously poured the “nuclear five” thirty years to find a formula acceptable to all transition from the old bipolar model of strategic stability the twentieth century to a new multi-stakeholder model of the XXI century. But the three decades in fact they were inept and lost. Now the old model stability quickly and irreversibly destroyed, while the new model is not yet visible even in the most General terms. The world is entering a twilight zone — it is not a separate rainy day Sunny in the summer, but beginning of long rainy season. For many reasons, geopolitical, organizational, technical and even psychological in nature in the coming years, most likely, will not be able to agree on, to sign and ratify the new “classic” agreements for the limitation of armaments.An exemplary design required the nuclear powers of the umbrella is not too complicated. It includes the extension of communication channels between the military at all levels, exchange information on their missile and nuclear forces and strategic doctrines and plans of modernization, the parallel measures to reduce the level of combat readiness of missile systems, the beginning of meaningful consultation on the most dangerous military technology, joint counteraction against threats of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Revealing over a the umbrella of the “nuclear five” would be able not only to reduce risks and cut costs inevitable new round of the arms race, but also to gain experience of working in a multilateral format, to create a minimum of trust are critical to solving more ambitious task in the nuclear field.Andrei Kortunov, an expert of the Valdai club, RIAC Director General
